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Abstract
Animals form groups for many reasons but there are costs and benefit associ-
ated with group formation. One of the benefits is collective memory. In groups on
the move, social interactions play a crucial role in the cohesion and the ability to
make consensus decisions. When migrating from spawning to feeding areas fish
schools need to retain a collective memory of the destination site over thousand of
kilometres and changes in group formation or individual preference can produce
sudden changes in migration pathways. We propose a modelling framework, based
on stochastic adaptive networks, that can reproduce this collective behaviour. We
assume that three factors control group formation and school migration behaviour:
the intensity of social interaction, the relative number of informed individuals and
the strength of preference that informed individuals have for a particular migration
area. We treat these factors independently and relate the individuals’ preferences
to the experience and memory for certain migration sites. We demonstrate that
removal of knowledgeable individuals or alteration of individual preference can
produce rapid changes in group formation and collective behaviour. For example,
intensive fishing targeting the migratory species and also their preferred prey can
reduce both terms to a point at which migration to the destination sites is suddenly
stopped. The conceptual approaches represented by our modelling framework may
therefore be able to explain large-scale changes in fish migration and spatial distri-
bution.
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1 Introduction
Grouping behaviour is a widespread phenomenon in animal ecology and is thought
to be an emerging property of the self-organisation of individual organisms [1]. While
living in groups, social animals benefit from several advantages among which is a more
efficient capacity in problem solving [2–4]. Of particular interest is the ability of the
group to make collective decisions also when it is composed of individuals with con-
trasting preferences and information [5,6]. How groups reach a consensus decision has
recently received much attention [5, 7–9] and several mechanisms to pool information
in the group have been proposed [1, 6].
Often no obvious reason can be adduced to explain the social behaviour of certain
species except the fact that those groups are more efficient than single individuals in
retrieving information from the environment [9, 11, 12]. For groups on the move, such
as fish schooling, bird flocking or mammal herding, it has been shown that information
transfer and social interactions are important factors of group cohesion and can promote
the ability of making consensus decisions [5, 13, 14].
An example of such a collective decision making problem is the structure of migra-
tion routes in some fish species. Migration between widely separated but geographi-
cally stable locations of spawning and feeding sites raises several questions about how
these animals manage to learn and remember the migration route between feeding and
spawning sites. Where is the information on the path stored? How is it retrieved, shared
and elaborated by a migrating group? Are these tasks performed significantly better by
the group with respect to the individuals? Shedding light on the functioning of these
mechanisms is a fundamental issue in ecology but may also be relevant to fields such as
sociology and economy where it is common to deal with large systems of competitive
agents that share information [4, 11]. We hypothesize that collective memory might
play an important role in the migration process of fish populations [13] and model its
effects on schooling behaviour and migration efficiency. We tackle these questions
by assuming that individuals have different amounts of information about migration
routes and that only a fraction of them possesses some information, whereas the rest
only exhibit a social behaviour. Those assumptions are consistent with numerical sim-
ulations of the evolution of leader and social traits in migratory populations [15,16] but
are introduced in our model in a different way. In fact previous approaches mainly fall
in a class of agent based models with spatial interaction [1, 15, 17–19] where “social”
individuals tend to align and to follow the individuals that are nearby, in a finite spatial
range. This reproduces a realistic dynamics, but it gives little insight on the mecha-
nisms by which the collective behaviour emerges from individual interactions. Indeed
due to their complexity, spatial dynamics models can only be studied with extensive
numerical simulations.
Here, instead, we take a stochastic adaptive network approach. Network approaches
have already been successfully applied to address collective behaviour in animal groups
[8, 20, 21]: adaptive network models provide, in fact, a simpler mathematical structure
which can be analysed more easily than real space models (i.e. without relying on
simulations). In all these models, as in ours, spatial dynamics is implicitly taken into
account through link creation and destruction processes: changes in the neighbourhood
of the individuals due to spatial dynamics are reproduced by link dynamics between
nodes (see Figure 1).
Capitalizing on previous models [22, 23], we build a model introducing the key
ingredient of memory for preferred route directions in a fraction of the individuals (the
informed ones). This is introduced as an a priori bias for a particular route in the
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choice behaviour of the informed individuals, that is based on their experience in that
particular habitat: their memory. Therefore, the collective choice of the route direction,
is a function of individual and social processes. We are able to find an exact solution
for the model that provides a clear picture of how information is elaborated, stored and
shared in the group and allows us to describe an observed switch of migratory path in
fish populations as a result of a loss of group level information.
Figure 1: Connection between link creation and destruction process and real space
models where η is the link creation rate and λ the link destruction rate.
2 Theoretical framework
Most studies about swarming phenomena in animal groups have relied on real space
dynamical models [1]. Here, we address the issue of group formation using a network
dynamical model [22, 23]. neighbouring nodes in the graph correspond to neighbour-
ing individuals in space (Figure 1).
Let us consider a group with N individuals. In our network model each individual
is represented by a node (thus N is the total number of nodes) and each node i has an in-
ternal dynamical variable ai that can take integer values ranging from 1 to q. Although
the mathematical solution does not depend on the specific interpretation of the variable
ai, in the context of migrating groups, ai might be considered as the direction taken
by a single individual to reach the destination site. Links between nodes represent in-
teractions among individuals by which they influence each other in their choice of the
destination. While space is not explicitly resolved we assume that neighbouring nodes
in the graph correspond to neighbouring individuals in space (Figure 1). Yet nearby
individuals need not necessarily influence each other (see below).
More precisely, a state of the system is defined by the adjacency matrix of the
system gi j and by the set of the internal dynamical states variables ai. In our model,
links are mutual and, thus, the adjacency matrix is a symmetric matrix (i.e. for all i, j
we have that gi j = g ji) such that gi j = 1 if there is a link between the nodes i and j,
gi j = 0 otherwise. The evolution of the system is governed by stochastic dynamics in
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which both the neighbourhood and the values of the internal dynamical state may vary,
according to stochastic Poissonian processes. These are discussed in the following (we
refer the reader to the Supplementary Material for a detailed mathematical definition).
2.1 Network dynamics
The network evolves by creation and destruction of links, that mimic the spatial interac-
tion between individuals. Link creation is quantified by the rate η at which individuals
form new links with other individuals, This rate encodes both evolutionarily selected
traits for pro-social behaviour and environmental factors, notably the average distance
between individuals. In our model we assume that the interactions between individuals
heading towards different directions decay much faster than interactions between close
individuals heading towards the same direction. This is in agreement with real space
dynamical model and is achieved in the network by assuming that link creation can
occur only when individuals have the same internal state ai = a j. This is equivalent to
saying that if ai 6= a j the link between nodes decays immediately.
Finally, individuals linked and moving in the same direction can also move further
apart from each other, which is formally encoded by assuming that links between nodes
decay with a constant rate λ . These two processes provide a mean field description of
the real space dynamics. Indeed link creation and decay depend on the geometry of
the neighbourhood in spatially explicit models, which is averaged out within the mean
field description. Mean field approximations such as this one work very well to capture
the qualitative behaviour of complex systems. To set an analogy, in a gas, one does
not need to trace the trajectory of each molecule. It is enough to provide a "collision
integral", that loosely speaking gives the probability that a particle moving in a certain
direction will interact with a particle moving in a different direction. Here we are taking
the same approach.
2.2 Internal state dynamics
The change of the internal state is a Poissonian process that occurs with rate ν for each
individual. The choice of the destination ai is influenced by two factors: i) pro-social
behaviour, by which an individual keeps the same destination of their neighbours and
ii) memory, by which an isolated individual preferentially heads toward a destination
αi that is encoded in its memory.
More precisely, when an individual updates its internal state, i) if it is linked to other
individuals(s), it will update its internal state conforming to the state of the majority in
its neighbourhood; i.e., the new state a′i is:
a′i = argmax
x
(
∑
j
gi jδxa j
)
(1)
In this formula δxy is Kronecker delta function: i.e. if x= y, δxy = 1, otherwise δxy = 0.
Again this rule is necessary within our mean field description of spatial interaction
because if an individual were to chose a direction which is different from that of the
(majority of the) group it is in, it would quickly move far apart and its links would
decay.
On the other hand, ii) if an individual is isolated (not linked), its choice of the
internal state is influenced by its preference for a destination that is encoded in their
memory. More precisely, we assume that each individual has a preferred value of the
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internal variable, let us call it αi. In the case of an internal state update event, an un-
linked individual will pick up a state according to the following probability distribution:
Prob(ai = a) =
ehαiδaαi
q−1+ ehαi (2)
where hαi is a parameter that measures the intensity of the preference. This encodes,
besides information processing and storage capabilities, also environmental factors re-
lated to the properties of a given feeding site, such as quantity of prey, water tempera-
ture, water quality etc.
The fraction of individuals with a preferred destination α is nα but we also con-
template a fraction n0 of “uninformed” individuals, that have no a priori preference
for any memorized destination. We use the convention that uninformed individuals
have αi = 0 and hαi = 0. Therefore, uninformed individuals update their direction at
random, which is described by Eq. (2) with hα=0 = 0.
Previous network approaches used a voter model update rule instead of a majority
rule [8, 20, 21]; this choice makes no qualitative difference in the stationary case, since
our main results are based on a state space decomposition (see Supplementary Materi-
als) that remains valid as long as the update rule promotes local uniformity. However,
we expect detectable differences in the transient behaviour of these systems. Biologi-
cally, a majority rule captures the non-linearity of group behaviour.
As in spatially explicit models, in our description individuals compromise about
directional choices. The majority rule does not prohibit that an individual i heading
towards a given destination may change its route upon the encounter of another indi-
vidual j. While this is not an elementary event described by the processes above, it
can clearly occur as a composite event that entails the decay of all the links of i, an
update of its choice and the formation of a link with j. The probability of this event is
non-zero and it decreases with the number of individuals i is interacting with, as one
expects.
In some cases individuals in groups need to compromise between information gath-
ering from the environment and social cohesion of the group [9, 24] and thus some
previous modelling approaches have assumed a trade-off between information capabil-
ities and pro-social behaviour, in that informed individuals have a reduced tendency to
follow their peers. The present modelling framework may be extended to encompass
this situation also by making, for example η take different values for informed and un-
informed individuals. This generalization of the model leads to the same conclusions
as those discussed below but it comes at the cost of more complex mathematics. In
addition, there is no conclusive evidence, as far as we are aware of, that such trade-off
really exist in populations of fishes (see e.g. [5]). We have however checked that adding
these trade-offs to the model is inconsequential as far as the main results of the model
discussed here is concerned, that is why we discuss these aspects in the supplementary
materials.
2.3 Invariant distribution
Given the above transition rates, we can write down the master equation (see the Sup-
plementary Material) and derive the invariant distribution which describes the station-
ary state. One key observation in this is that, since only links between nodes with the
same internal state can be established, the process will converge to states where all
links (i, j) are between nodes with ai = a j. Any state with links (i, j) connecting nodes
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with ai 6= a j is transient, i.e. is not going to occur in the long run. This allows us to
partition the states of the system into a transient class and a closed ergodic class. This
ensures that the invariant distribution is unique. It can be shown (see Supplementary
Materials for the details) that the process satisfies detailed balance and the probability
to observe state with a given network {gi j} and profile of choices {ai} in the stationary
state, is given by:
pi({gi j},{ai}) = 1
Z ∏j<i
e∑i hαiδaiαi
(
2ηδaia j
λ (N−1)
)gi j
. (3)
where Z is the normalization constant. In particular, when, for some i and j we have
that ai 6= a j and gi j = 1 , the invariant distribution is zero. We are also assuming the
convention that 00 = 1.
Let Nαa = ∑ j δa jaδα jα be the number of individuals that are in state a but would
like to be in state α and let nαa =
Nαa
N .
If, in eq. (3), we call
z = 2
η
λ
(4)
the non-dimensional parameter that accounts for the effective creation of links in the
network, thus measuring the sociality of the group, then with standard mathematical
manipulations (see Supplementary Materials) we can easily write the stationary state
distribution in terms of the densities n = {nαa } as follow:
p(n) =
1
Z
e−N
[
F(n;z,h)+O(1/N)
]
(5)
where
F(n;z,h) =∑
a
n0a log(n
0
a)+∑
aα
nαa log(n
α
a )−∑
aα
hαnαa δαa−
z
2∑a
(na)2 (6)
and Z is the normalization constant. In the large population limit (N→ ∞) this distri-
bution peaks exponentially in N around the minima of F.
The stationary points of F(n;z,h) satisfies the following system of equations:
nαa = e
hαδaα+zna n
α
(ehα −1)eznα +∑a ezna
(7)
where na = ∑i nia is the total density of individuals whose internal state is a (See Sup-
plementary Materials for detailed calculation).
Therefore with a large number of individuals and in the stationary state of the sys-
tem we are able to use Eq. (7) to analytically describe the fraction of individuals with
a priori preference α that end up heading towards destination a.
This set of non-linear equations has many solutions in principle. Those correspond-
ing to stationary states can be fully characterized in terms of the average degree of the
network 〈k〉 (i.e. the average number of neighbours of individuals) that is a proxy
for the school density. It can be shown that one measure of the network degree is
〈k〉= z
(
1− 1q
)
σ + zq where the quantity:
σ =
q∑i(ni)2−1
q−1 . (8)
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is a direct measure of the school efficiency and it takes values between σ = 1, when all
individuals belong to a group that migrates towards the same destination; and σ = 0
when individuals distribute equally between different destinations. Hence the solution
with high coordination (σ ' 1) also corresponds to high network densities 〈k〉 ' z.
Among all the solutions of Eq. (7), we shall focus on those corresponding to the
global minimum of F(n;z,h) that determine the behaviour of the system, since they
correspond to the values around which the stationary distribution shall peak.
3 Results
We shall analyse two cases 1) the case of a population without informed individuals,
n0 = 1, and 2) the case where a fraction n1 = 1−n0 of the individuals have a preferred
migratory destination, whereas the rest is not informed.
Figure 2: Critical group dynamic: school efficiency, σ as function of the social param-
eter z in (a) non informed group n1 = 0 and (b) informed group n1 = 0.05, h= 0.5. The
dotted lines correspond to all the stable solutions of (7), the shadowed areas identify
the coexistence region whereas the solid lines correspond to the equilibrium solution.
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3.1 Migration without information
When no information is available in the group, the system reduces to an adaptive net-
work model in which group coordination only depends on the rates at which links are
created or destroyed [22, 23].
Below a certain threshold zˇ only one local minimum exists which corresponds to
a symmetric solution σ = 0 (Figure 2 a); there the network is sparse,〈k〉 < 1, and
the group does not migrate. At zˇ, a new bundle of q local minima appears at which
σ > 0. There the network is dense, 〈k〉> 1, and a fraction of the individuals comparable
with N (called in graph theory giant component) is connected with one another and
coordinated on the same destination choice.
The analysis also produces the full probability distribution of different states that al-
lows ranking the solutions in terms of their probability (see Supplementary Materials).
Between zˇ and zˆ both solutions coexist and individuals can migrate in a coordinated
manner or not. Above zˆ the only local minima are for σ > 0 while the sparse solution
σ = 0 becomes unstable. There is an intermediate point z∗ below which the sparse
solution is the most likely outcome whereas, above it, the high density solution will
prevail.
Figure 3: Phase diagram of the system with q = 4 possible directions. The grey area
corresponds to a preference parameter h= 0 (no preferences) and the dashed line is the
critical line. The blue area corresponds to h= 0.5 and the thick blue line represents the
corresponding critical line. The red area corresponds to h = 1 and the thick red line
represents the corresponding critical line as well.
3.2 Informed migration
In order to analyse the role of information in the model, we study the simplest possible
case, with q destinations, a density of informed individual n1 = 1−n0 and a preference
h about a single destination.
The equation (7) again can be solved numerically to obtain prediction on schooling
behaviour. Information has two main effects on the system (Figure 2 b). First, it
breaks the symmetry between the q high density solutions found in the n0 = 1 case, by
selecting the solution with the preferred destination α = 1 as the most likely. The q−1
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solutions corresponding to migration toward other destinations remain stable, but are
much less likely to be selected by the population.
Secondly, the coexistence region between high and low density solutions [zˇ, zˆ] is
reduced in the case of informed migration (Figure 2). In fact this region becomes
smaller as the number of informed individuals increases (Figure 3).
Eventually, there exists a critical value of n1 at which the region collapses into a
point. This change in the behaviour of the system is equivalent to a second order phase
transition in physics. For values of n1 greater than this critical point the system has
a smooth transition between low and high density states, as z increases, and a single
solution is found. Moreover the coexistence region and the critical value change with
h. The thick line in Figure 3 marks the point, in the coexistence region, where the two
solutions are equally probable; on the right (left) of this line we expect to see the high
(low) density solution.
The behaviour of the solution as the parameters h and n1 = 1−n0 vary, at fixed z,
is depicted in Figure 4. For low values of z (Figure 4a) we observe a smooth crossover
from low to high density solutions as h and/or n1 increase whereas when z is larger the
system exhibits a sharp transition between the two solutions (Figure 4b). The presence
of a sharp transition with coexistence in a broad range of parameters is a robust feature
of this model.
For more complicated settings using competing groups with different preferred mi-
gratory destinations, it can be shown that, for large z the population coordinates towards
the migratory destination that provides the largest product nαhα (see Supplementary
Materials). This quantity can be interpreted as the strength of the group’s collective
memory toward a given migration site, α .
This provides us with a vivid picture of how we expect the collective behaviour
of the population to change when the parameters z, h and n0 change. Adapting this
picture to the observed behaviour of populations provides hints on the likely underlying
causal effects. In brief, when z is large, i.e. for individuals with a marked pro-social
behaviour, we expect abrupt transitions when either the density nα of individuals with
a given preference, or the intensity hα of that preference varies in such a way as to
cross the boundaries in the phase diagram (Figure 3).
When both the density of informed individuals and the intensity of preference hα
decrease, abrupt transition from efficient group formation to collapse of migration ef-
ficiency is visible. We note that this hysteresis cycle is consistent with observed stock
collapses of migratory fish populations [25]. When the migratory population is de-
scribed using a social parameter z close to the critical point, then the interplay between
the memory for a given destination, h, and the fraction of the individuals informed, n1
about this destination can produce an abrupt transition in the migration of the species.
In the case of a school migrating in direction 1, a decrease of the value of h and n1
over years due, for example, to overfishing of both individuals and prey in the migration
site, can force the system to cross the critical line reaching eventually low values of
both h and n1. When in this condition, an increase in the value of h might occur due for
example to better habitat conditions or food availability, for those few vagrant fish that
might still be present in the area. However this increase alone cannot bring the system
back to the original state because the system may not cross again the critical line. Thus
the group may not migrate in direction 1 even though previous habitat conditions are
re-established.
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Figure 4: School efficiency σ as function of the fraction of informed individuals n1
and strength of the preference h when the social parameter z is (a) in a non critical
region z = 2.5 and (b) in a critical region z = 3.1 The white line in panel (b) is a
schematic illustration of the hysteresis mechanism for a bluefin tuna population starting
with high n1 and h, then decreasing n1 and h (overfishing of both preys and predators)
and subsequently increasing h (increase of population of preys).
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4 Discussion
We show that abrupt changes in migratory patterns of animal groups can be caused by
removal of knowledgeable individuals from the group or by decreasing preference of
the individuals towards a particular migratory destination.We demonstrate this with a
robust analytical approach that allows to clearly identify the factors regulating group
formation processes. Our results are consistent with previous models suggesting that a
small number of informed individual can lead to large group migrations [14, 26]. Ad-
ditionally we demonstrate that diminishing individual preference for a given migration
site can preclude group formation and break the migration process.
4.1 The migration game
The migration process can be described as an emergent property of the population
undertaking a group formation game: when the spatial density of fish is locally low,
each individual moves independently, and the system is in a sparse network configu-
ration with a value of z below the lower edge of the coexistence region. In this state
uninformed individuals cannot migrate whereas informed individuals can undertake a
solitary migration towards their preferred destination. Owing to external stimuli (wa-
ter temperature, local currents, topography, etc. ) the density may increase and so
does the value of z, driving the system toward the coexistence region. In this region
even though the local density of fish is high, a sparse network configuration with fish
moving independently is still stable but an alternative and stable dense network config-
uration also appears. When the system reaches the upper edge of this region, further
increasing the density, the sparse network state becomes unstable while the dense net-
work state prevails and the school starts a migration toward the preferred destination.
On the other hand an hysteretic cycle is present in this system and when the local
density of fish decreases in the school, z, decreases and the system is driven back to
the coexistence region. A similar effect can be reproduced in the system by lowering
the preference factor, h. The schooling configuration remains stable until the system
reaches the lower edge of the coexistence region: at this point, fish stop schooling and
the system switches back into the sparse configuration (solitary fish).
The group formation game described above can be repeated each year naturally
driving changes in the preference term h, hence in the memory of migratory fish. Like-
wise changes in this or in the other terms of the model may occur when the migratory
population is affected by external stimuli , e.g., overfishing, habitat degradation, demo-
graphic fluctuations. Because of the hysteretic cycle, such variations may then result
in abrupt changes in the migratory patterns.
4.2 Conflicting preferences
From the asymptotic analysis (Supplementary Materials) we demonstrate that, for large
value of z, the group shall migrate toward the direction α for which the product nαhα is
maximal, whereas in the limit of small z, the sparse configuration is the only stable one.
This suggest that our results might be extended to groups with conflicting preferences.
It is relevant to note that in our model all individuals have a social component. For
example in groups with conflicting preferences our model suggests that, for some range
of the parameters, an informed individual can follow the group and migrate toward a
site different from its preferred destination. This approach makes our definition of
leaders not only dependent on the amount of information stored but also on the social
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context in which they live. Therefore, the interaction between personal information and
social effects is explicitly resolved in our model and—we note—it has been suggested
to operate in living groups [5, 6].
4.3 Collective memory and breakdown of social traditions
Breakdown of social traditions, due to selected fishing on older informed individuals,
has been hypothesized to have contributed to stock collapses in several large commer-
cially important fish populations [13, 25].
Our sketch of the migration game suggests that social dynamics may lead to such
collapses and that the integrity of migration pathways and spatial distributions of mi-
gratory predators might be particularly vulnerable to perturbations such as fishing or
habitat degradation. Fishing out informed individuals and their prey can exacerbate
the loss of collective memory up to the point where a migratory pathway is suddenly
interrupted. We can assume that each year young individuals join the group: among
them a fraction is able to gather information and remember a migratory route whereas
the rest has a purely social behaviour. The “information-gathering-able” individuals
behave as uninformed individuals (h = 0) but learn a new migratory route during the
first migration(s). If the group does not succeed in starting migration, or migrates to-
ward a different location, the young “information-gathering-able” individuals will not
learn the traditional migration route of the group and the social traditions of the group
will not be transmitted to the new generations. The loss of collective memory in the
group will then force the system to cross the critical line and the migration toward the
destination site will stop.
An example of a prey-predator collapse and subsequent abrupt disappearance of
migratory route is provided by Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus LINNAEUS,
1758) and its main prey, herring (Clupea harengus LINNAEUS, 1758) in the Norwegian
and the North Seas. During the 1950s-1970s both species were heavily exploited in
these regions resulting in the disappearances of both species [28–30]. Since then, the
herring populations in both regions have recovered to moderate-high levels [28, 29],
but bluefin tuna have been extremely rare during the 1980s-2000s and apparently had
not migrated to these areas in large numbers since the disappearance several decades
ago [30]. These hysteretic dynamics are consistent with a fishing-induced removal
of predators having preference for migration to these regions and a fishing induced
decline in habitat quality which then leads to the collapse of group formation and a
sudden change in migratory path (cf. Figure 4).
5 Conclusions
We have presented a model that offers and elucidates a plausible mechanism for migra-
tion dynamics. By extending and generalizing previous approaches, our model shows
that group formation dynamics have a critical dependence on both sociality, number
of informed individuals and strength of the preference in informed individuals. For
example, partial removal of knowledgeable individuals may be sufficient to interrupt
the transmission of social traditions in groups of animals. Such critical dependence is
consistent with abrupt transitions that are commonly observed in migration patterns of
social animals such as Atlantic bluefin tuna as well as other fish populations [25].
Our findings offer deep insight into migration dynamics and suggest interesting
directions both for data analysis (e.g. new interpretations of spatial temporal dynam-
12
ics of migratory populations) and for further theoretical development (e.g. accounting
for conflicting preferences, continuous directions, different segregation policies, topo-
logical interaction). Contrary to previous Agent Based approaches [1, 15, 17–19], our
model has the advantage of being analytically soluble, and thus it provides a powerful
theoretical bench test for hypotheses on collective animal behaviour.
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A Supplementary materials
In these supplementary materials we provide the details of the technical calculation
that are presented in the main paper and provide additional comments and details.
In the first section we detail the definition of the model. In the following section we
comment on the interpretation of the parameters in terms of fish migratory behaviour.
The third section contains a detailed derivation of the stationary state distribution (the
invariant measure), equations (6) of the paper. From this we derive the population
distribution Eq. (8).
This is then analysed in the limit of large populations (the thermodynamic limit)
leading to the expression of the free energy (9) of main paper. Finally we provide
details on the calculation of the equilibrium solution (10) of main paper, and of other
results cited in the main paper.
A.1 Mathematical definition of the model
Let N be the number of individuals in the group and q the number of possible values
for that the internal variable can take (i.e. the possible directions a fish may take).
For any finite N and q, a state of the system is defined by the network of interaction
between individuals and by the values of the internal variables of the individuals. The
processes described in the main text define a stochastic dynamics on this state space.
For example, when a link is created between two individuals i and j the system will
make a transition between a state in which the network of interaction has no link be-
tween i and j and a state in which the link between i and j is added. We use the letter ω
to generically refer to a state, i.e. ω = (G,a) where G is the N×N adjacency matrix
of the system (i.e. (G)i j = gi j ∈ {0,1}), and a = (ai) is a vector whose i-th compo-
nent is the values of the internal variable of i-th node. We also use S to refer of all
the possible states in which the system can be (i.e. the state space). ωˆ(t) represents
the state of the system at time t which shall be equal to one of the states described
above. Mathematically, our system is a Continuous Time Markov Chain and therefore,
its evolution over time is described by a Master Equation for the probabilities:
∂tP(ω, t) =∑
ω ′
P(ω ′, t)ρ(ω ′→ ω)−P(ω, t)∑
ω ′
ρ(ω → ω ′) (9)
where
P(ω, t) = Prob(ωˆ(t) = ω); (10)
and the ρ are the transition rates which correspond to the three dynamical processes
described in Methods Section of the main paper. For clarity sake we describe them
again here.
link creation With a rate η each node i can establish a link with another j node picked
up randomly among the others. The link is established only if ai = a j
This process can connect only two states ω and ω ′ such that ghk = g′hk ∀ (h,k) 6=
(i, j), gi j = 0 and g′i j = 1. The transition rate is clearly
ρ(ω → ω ′) = 2η
N−1δa′ia′j (11)
link destruction Each link ha a destruction rate λ .
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This process can connect only two states ω and ω ′ such that ghk = g′hk ∀ (h,k) 6=
(i, j), gi j = 1 and g′i j = 0. The transition rate is clearly
ρ(ω → ω ′) = λ (12)
preference update Each node can update its internal state at a rate ν .
If the node is linked when an internal state update event occurs, it will conform
to its neighbourhood. When an internal state update event occurs for a linked
individual i, thus, the new internal state of that individual a′i is chosen using a
majority rule, that is :
a′i = argmax
x
(
∑
j
gi jδxa j
)
(13)
This assumption is coherent with what is usually done in modelling group motion
that is assuming that an individual tend to "follow" its neighbours.
Instead, when a node is not linked, it undergoes a random transition to a state
a′i; the probability of picking up one direction over another encodes the a priori
information the individual has. Each individual has a direction preference αi.
If αi = 0 then each direction has the same probability( 1q ) of being chosen (no a
priori information); if αi ∈ {1, ...,q} than the i-th individual has a higher proba-
bility of picking the direction αi over the others. In mathematical term, this can
be written as:
Prob(a′i = a) =
ehαiδaαi
q−1+ ehαi , gi j = 0 ∀ j (14)
where hαi > 0 measure the strength of the preference of node i for the direction
αi. We assume that the strength of the preferences hα does not vary among
the individuals that share the same direction preference but may be different for
individuals preferring different directions.
All other transition besides the three classes discussed above, have zero rates.
The model can be generalized in different ways. In particular, the creation rate ηα
can be taken to depend on whether individuals are informed (α > 0) or not (α = 0). In
general, if the propensity for forming social links among fishes with preferred direction
α is ηα , then this more general model entails substituting 2η with ηαi +ηα j in (11).
This reflects the fact that the creation of the link between i and j may be initiated by
either i or j an hence their rates add.
For the sake of simplicity, we shall focus our discussion to the case ηα = η for all
α = 1, . . . ,q. Indeed, the derivation proceeds along exactly the same lines and the gist
of the main results is the same. We shall deal with the general case in Section A.7.
A.2 Interpretation of the parameters of the model
Our theoretical framework is a stylised representation of the migratory behaviour of
fish populations. The three parameters of the model have a clear interpretation in terms
of biological traits of the individuals and of the physical conditions of the environment
in which they interact.
The value of η must have a dependence on the density of individuals; most of the
real space models assume that individuals interact only with “close” individuals (e.g.
closer than a certain radius) which is a reasonable description of the natural behaviour
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of schooling fishes; thus if the local density of individuals is too low the probability
of being close enough to interact with one another is small and thus the link creation
rate must also be small; on the contrary the higher the density, the higher the number
of “close” individuals and the higher the creation rate must be. At the same time, η
quantifies also the pro-social behavior of individuals which is encoded in the genetic
make-up of the species. A social fish is expected to be able to interact with other
individuals of its species more effectively than a fish of a non social species: by the
rules of our model, this means that at a given local density of individuals the social
species will have a significantly higher link creation rate η and lower link destruction
rate λ and thus a higher value of their ratio z = η/λ . A variation of local density
may induce even significant variation of η and therefore of z. The range of these
variations,however, may be seen as a genetically determined quantity.
The interpretation of the other parameters is easier, the value of nα is the relative
proportion of individuals in the population with preference for destination α; the value
of hα implicitly measures the strength of the preference, which in turn may encode
the property of a given feeding site, such as quantity of prey, water temperature, water
quality etc.
A.3 Master Equation and Invariant Measure
The derivation of the stationary state distribution, which is the solution of Eq. (9) with
∂tP(ω, t) = 0, relies on the following observations:
1. the states of the system can be classified into two sets: one A that contains all the
states in which the network does not contain links between different nodes – i.e.
nodes that have different value of their internal variable – and T containing all the
states in S that are not in A . In particular the states for which the network has no
links are in A ;
2. transition from any state ω ′ ∈ A to any state in ω ∈ T are impossible since the
rates vanish
ρ(ω → ω ′) = 0, ∀ω ′ ∈A , and ∀ω ∈T . (15)
In words, link between nodes i and j with different internal variables ai 6= a j cannot
be generated in the course of the dynamics.
3. If any such link exists at a given time t, then i) it must be present in the initial
conditions and ii) it has a finite life time, because any link decays at a rate λ .
4. As a consequence, the dynamics sooner or later reaches a state ω ∈A where no link
between different nodes exists, and from that time onwards states ω ′ ∈ T where
at least one link between different nodes exists, will never be reached. In formal
terms, this means that states ω ∈T are transient and therefore they occur with zero
probability in the stationary state
lim
t→∞P(ω, t) = 0, ∀ω ∈T . (16)
5. it is possible to reach any state in A starting from any state in A . More precisely,
for any two states ω,ω ′ ∈A it is possible to find a sequence of transitions between
intermediate states connecting ω to ω ′, with each transition having a positive prob-
ability. One such “path” of transitions, for example” is the one where first all the
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links in the initial state ω decay, then the internal variables of each node is updated
from the one prevailing in state ω to the one in ω ′, and finally all the links in state ω ′
are sequentially added. Each of the intermediate states ω ′′ along this path is also in
A and each transition between consecutive states on the path occurs with a strictly
positive rate. Since the number of states on the path is finite, this means that the
probability P{ωˆ(t) = ω|ωˆ(t0) = ω ′} to find the system in ω at time t given that it
was in state ω ′ at an earlier time t0 < t is strictly positive.
6. Since the process can reach any state in A from any other state in A this proves
that the dynamics is ergodic when restricted to A . This implies that the stationary
state exists and is unique (see e.g. [2]).
7. it is easy to verify, by direct substitution, that the probability distribution
pi(ω) =
1
Z
{
e∑i hαiδaiαi ∏ j<i
(
2η
λ (N−1)
)gi j
ω ∈A
0 ω ∈T
(17)
whereZ is the normalization constant ensuring ∑ω pi(ω) = 1, satisfies the detailed
balance condition
pi(ω)ρ(ω → ω ′) = pi(ω ′)ρ(ω ′→ ω). (18)
Indeed, for each ω,ω ′ for which ρ(ω→ω ′) = 0 we have either that ρ(ω ′→ω) = 0
also or that ρ(ω ′ → ω) > 0 but ω ′ ∈ T , and therefore Eq. (18) holds because
pi(ω ′) = 0. When both ρ(ω→ ω ′)> 0 and ρ(ω ′→ ω)> 0, then either ω,ω ′ ∈T
and then Eq. (18) holds because pi(ω) = pi(ω ′) = 0, or ω,ω ′ ∈ A . In the latter
case ω differs from ω ′ either for the presence of one link or for the value of the
internal variable of a single isolated node. In both cases, one can check that Eq.
(18) holds. This means that if P(ω, t) = pi(ω) then ∂tP(ω, t) = 0, i.e. pi(ω) is a
stationary distribution of the process.
8. Since the stationary state is unique we conclude that
pi(ω) = lim
t→∞P(ω, t) (19)
is the invariant distribution.
The fact that a process satisfies detailed balance is related to the existence of a
potential function H (ω) = − logpi(ω) such that each transition can be interpreted as
either “climbing” or “descending” the landscape of H . In order to gain intuition on
why the process satisfies detailed balance one can argue that such a functionH exists
for this process. Indeed, notice that the process links states which differ by one link
(with the profile a of nodes’ variables constant) or states with the same graph G, which
differ only by the attribute ai of a single isolated node. In the fist case, the transition rate
is the same, so the process, at fixed a, can be described as “climbing” or “descending”
a step of a functionH that depends only on the number of links added. In the second
case, the dynamics of a at fixed G involve rates that depend only on whether a node is
updated so that his attribute ai equals the preferred value αi or not. This can be captured
by a potentialH that takes two different values depending on whether ai = αi or not.
We note that pi(ω) is the invariant distribution under a broader set of choices of
the internal state update rule. Indeed Eq. (13) can be replaced by any rule by which
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the choice of the internal state a′i is limited to the values a j of the neighbours of node
i. For example, if Eq. (13) is replaced by a rule where node i takes the value a j of a
randomly chosen neighbour j, as in the voter model, the process converges to the same
invariant distribution pi . This is because once the process reaches a state ω ∈ A , the
link creation/destruction policy ensures that local uniformity that characterizes states
in A will be preserved.
We may expect, however, that the choice of the internal state update rule may in-
fluence the transient behaviour of the system (e.g. average time to reach the stationary
state, structure of the metastable states).The analysis of those behaviour, albeit very
interesting, is beyond the scope of this work.
A.3.1 The population distribution
In order to take the thermodynamic limit we need to obtain an expression in which the
number of nodes N is explicit. That is we need to infer from the invariant measure (17)
an expression for the probability distribution function of the populations involved.
Let’s consider a partition of the entire population (i.e. the number of nodes) N into
classes. Let Nαa = |{i|(ai = a)∧ (αi = α)}| be the number of nodes with preferred
state α that are in the state a. Moreover we define a class of uninformed individuals
and define N0a = |{i|(ai = a)∧ (αi = 0)}| as the number of nodes with state a that have
no preference (i.e. α = 0). We denote by N = {Nαa , a = 1, . . . ,q, α = 0,1, . . . ,q} the
profile of population occupation states. Obviously
∑
a,α
Nαa +∑
a
N0a = N (20)
We define Ωˆ(N) = {ω ∈ (G,a) : (|{ j : (a j = a)∧ (α j = α)}| = Nαa )∧ ({ j : (a j =
a)∧ (αn = 0)}| = N0a )} as the subset of states ω with profile N. The probability to
observe N is clearly given by
p(N) = pi(Ωˆ(N)) = ∑
ω∈Ωˆ(N)
pi(ω). (21)
For sake of simplification we shall use the following notation: Na = ∑α Nαa +N0a
which denotes the number of nodes in actual state a, Nα = ∑a Nαa which denotes the
number of nodes with preferred state α , N0 = ∑a N0a which denote the number of un-
informed nodes. Clearly Nα , N0 are known and fixed.
For each configuration of the internal variables, the equilibrium dynamics allows
∑a 2
Na(Na−1)
2 different network configurations with non-zero probability. The weight of
all network structures with a given number ma of links in a given preference class is
the same (since only networks with links between coordinated nodes carry non zero
contribution). Calculating their contribution to p(N) reduces to counting how many
different network structure are there with a given number of links ma in each component
a. The answer is trivially
((Na2 )
ma
)
The network contribution to p(N) is then
∑
m1,...,mq
q
∏
a=1
((Na
2
)
ma
)[
2η
λ (N−1)
]ma
=∏
a
[
1+
2η
λ (N−1)
](Na2 )
(22)
Concerning the statistical weight coming from individual preferences, we notice
that:
∑
i
hαiδaiαi =∑
α
hα∑
i
δαi,αδaiα =∑
α
hαNαα
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Thus this results in a statistical weight given by exp(∑a haNaa ).
In order to compute p(N) we notice that there are exactly N!∏a N0a !∏aα Nαa !
configura-
tion with the same weight and thus we can write
p(N) =
1
Z
N!
∏a N0a !∏aα Nαa !
e∑α hαN
α
α ∏
a
[
1+
2η
λ (N−1)
]Na
2 (Na−1)
(23)
Where Z is the normalization constant.
The measure is defined over the multisymplex defined by:
0≤ Nαa ≤ Nα (24)
and
∑Nαa = Nα (25)
A.4 Thermodynamic limit and equilibrium solution
Once we have a form for the p(N) we look for the asymptotic behavior for large N.
Let us denote the densities with nαa =
Nαa
N and consequently na = ∑α n
α
a and n
α =
∑a nαa for α = 0,1, . . . ,q and a = 1, . . . ,q.
Next, we expand log p(N) in a large N limit, using Stirling approximation(log(N!)'
N log(N)−N, log(1+ x)' x for small x and normalization :
∑
a
nαa = n
α . (26)
We then obtain :
log(p(N)) = N log(N)−N−∑
aα
(Nnαa log(N)+Nn
α
a log(n
α
a )−Nnαa )
+N∑
aα
hαδaαnαa +N
η
λ ∑a
(
N
N−1 (na)
2+
N
N−1
1
N
na
)
− logZ
=−N
[
∑
aα
nαa log(n
α
a )−∑
aα
hαnαa δaα −
η
λ ∑a
(na)2+O(1/N)
]
− logZ
(27)
This expression is reminiscent of Gibbs distribution in statistical physics
p(N) =
1
Z
e−N[F(n;
η
λ ,h)+O(1/N)]. (28)
where the free energy is given by
F(n;
η
λ
,h) =∑
a
n0a logn
0
a+∑
aα
nαa log(n
α
a )−∑
aα
hαnαa δαa−
η
λ ∑a
(na)2 (29)
In the limit of very large N the invariant measure concentrates on the global mini-
mum n∗ of the function F(n; ηλ ,h). Any state n with a value of F that is larger by δF
than the minimum, will have a probability p(n)∼ e−NδF which is exponentially small
compared to n∗, i.e. will virtually never occur for large N.
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A.4.1 Minimization of Free Energy
We then have to minimize the free energy F(n; ηλ ,h) of the system, over the variables
n subject to the constraints:
nα =∑
a
nαa (30)
and
n0 =∑
a
n0a (31)
We introduce then Lagrange multiplier βα − 1 for the first constraints and β0− 1
for the second one and impose first order conditions (FOC):
∇
{
F(n;
η
λ
,h)−∑
α
(βα −1)
[
−nα +∑
a
nαa
]
− (β0−1)(n0−∑
a
n0a)
}
= 0 (32)
obtaining
log(n0a)−
2η
λ
na−β0 = 0 (33)
and
log(nαa )−hαδaα −
2η
λ
na−βα = 0 (34)
and thus {
n0a = e
2η
λ naeβ0
nαa = e
hαδaα+ 2ηλ naeβα
(35)
If we define :
Q =∑
a
ezna (36)
we can write
n0 = eβ0Q (37)
and
nα = eβα e
2η
λ nα (ehα −1)+ eβα Q (38)
Equation (37) allows us to eliminate one Lagrangian multiplier:
eβ0 =
n0
Q
(39)
Equation (38) instead allows us to eliminate the quantity
eβα =
nα
(ehα −1)e 2ηλ nα +Q
(40)
We then have also the normalization constraint:
∑
i
ni = 1−n0. (41)
We can then write the FOC for our system in the following way
na = e
2η
λ na
[
n0
Q
+W +
(eh−1)na
(eh−1)e 2ηλ na +Q
]
(42)
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where
Q =
q
∑
i=1
e
2η
λ ni (43)
and
W =
q
∑
i=1
ni
(ehi −1)e 2ηλ ni +Q
(44)
These equations can be solved numerically to any preassigned degree of precision.
A.5 The n1 = 1−n0 case
When we consider systems where only one direction is preferred, some simplification
can be made.
To ease the notation we shall write z = 2ηλ , x = n1 and yi−1 = ni for i ∈ {2, ..,q}.
In this case equation (42) take the simplified form:xe
−x = z n
0
Q + ze
h 1−n0
(eh−1)ex+Q
yie−yi = zP = z n
0
Q + z
1−n0
(eh−1)ex+Q q-1 times
(45)
with the conditions
x+
q−1
∑
i=0
yi = z (46)
Q = ex+
q−1
∑
i=0
eyi (47)
and
P =
n0
Q
+W =
n0
Q
+
1−n0
(eh−1)ex+Q . (48)
Solving equation (48) with respect ex , calling Γ= PQ = n0+WQ we get:
ex
Q
=
1−Γ
Γ−n0
1
eh−1 (49)
and thus, plugging it in the first equation of (45), we obtain:
x =
z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0
[
(1− eh)n0+ ehΓ
]
(50)
Plugging the previous result in (49), we get Q. On the other hand form equation 1
in (45) we obtain
1−n0
(eh−1)ex+Q = P−
n0
Q
(51)
plugging everything in equation (45) we obtain the following system of equations
written in term of Γ :xe−x = zeh−1
[
(1− eh)n0+ ehΓ] 1−ΓΓ−n0 e− zeh−1 1−ΓΓ−n0 [(1−eh)n0+ehΓ]
ye−y = zeh−1Γ
1−Γ
Γ−n0 e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 [(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ] q-1 times
(52)
From previous equation (52) we can infer the structure of the solutions.
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Both equations have the same shape:
xe−x = c (53)
where c is a constant to be determined auto-consistently.
If c is negative the equation has only one negative (thus unphysical) solution, if c is
greater than e−1 it has no solution otherwise it admits solution which can be expressed
in terms of Lambert W functions [1]:
x− =−W0(−c) (54)
and
x+ =−W−1(−c) (55)
where W0,W−1 represents the two real branches of Lambert W function (using the
notation of [1]). It is trivial to check x− < 1 whereas x+ > 1 and that for small values
of c, x+ > z and thus is to be discarded.
In our case c is a complicate function of Γ but, as above, once Γ (and z) is fixed we
know that x and y can take only two values x± and y± as defined above and thus we
can label all the solutions using two integers α which counts the number of x in + state
(which of course is either 0 or 1) and L+ which counts the number of y in + state.
If we define, for notational ease:
B(Γ) =
z
eh−1Γ
1−Γ
Γ−n0 e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 [(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ] (56)
and
A(h,Γ) =
[
(1− eh)n0+ ehΓ
]
(57)
it is easy to check that solutions have the following hierarchy in the admissible range
Γ ∈ [n0,1]:
y−(A(0,Γ)B(Γ))≤ x−(A(h,Γ)B(Γ))≤ 1≤ x+(A(h,Γ)B(Γ))≤ y+(A(0,Γ)B(Γ)) (58)
The normalization equation (46) will then become, given integers α and L+:
αx+
(
z
eh−1
[
(1− eh)n0+ ehΓ
] 1−Γ
Γ−n0 e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 [(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ]
)
+(1−α)x−
(
z
eh−1
[
(1− eh)n0+ ehΓ
] 1−Γ
Γ−n0 e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 [(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ]
)
+
L+y+
(
z
eh−1Γ
1−Γ
Γ−n0 e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 [(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ]
)
+(q−1−L+)y−
(
z
eh−1Γ
1−Γ
Γ−n0 e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 [(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ]
)
= z.
(59)
Its solutions will give the Γ auto-consistently.
Since the previous substitution is valid only when (50) is assumed we can rewrite
the equation as:
L+y+
(
z
eh−1Γ
1−Γ
Γ−n0 e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 [(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ]
)
+(q−1−L+)y−
(
z
eh−1Γ
1−Γ
Γ−n0 e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 [(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ]
)
=z− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0
[
(1− eh)n0+ ehΓ
] (60)
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A.5.1 Stability
When nα = 1− n0 all the values nαa = 0 for α > 1 because of the normalization con-
straints; the Lagrangian function, thus, becomes ( here z = 2ηλ ):
L(n;z,h) = (β1−1)
(
n1+∑
a
n1a
)
− (ζ0−1)(n0−∑
a
n0a)−h1n11
+∑
a
n0a log(n
0
a)+n
1
a log(n
1
a)−
z
2
(na)2
(61)
To check the stability and the nature of these stationary points we have to check
the Hessian L of the Lagrangian restricted to the tangent space T to the constraints
manifold in the stationary point.
The stationary point will be a (local minimum) if and only if:
yTLy > 0 for any y ∈T (62)
In our case the constraint are linear; therefore the tangent space T is a 2q−2 dimen-
sional space and it can be easily seen to be spanned by the orthonormal base:
(ei) j =
1√
2
(δi j−2δ2q+1+ j (mod 2), j) (63)
where i ∈ {1, ..,2q} and j ∈ {1, ..,2q+2}. The projection operator then is given by the
matrix
Mi j = (ei) j (64)
Any vector y of T can be expressed by a general vector v of R2q as y =Mv. Equa-
tion (62) can be then expressed as:
vTMTLMv > 0 (65)
Thus in order to check the stability of a stationary point in the constrained problem we
can simply apply the usual Hessian criteria to the “effective Hessian Heff =MTLM
A.6 Asymptotic Expansion of the solutions of FOC for z→ ∞
In the case of z→ ∞ case it is easy to see that the minimum of F(n; ηλ ,h) must corre-
spond to states n∗a corresponding to na = 1 and nb = 0 for a = 1, . . . ,q and ∀b 6= a.
In order to gain some insight on which of these solutions is the true minimum of
the free energy for large but finite z we have to make and asymptotic expansion around
z = ∞.
An asymptotic expansion of na(z) can be derived from equation (42) for large z. It
is easy to verify that the leading correction is extremely small, i.e.
nb(z)' δab+O(e−z) (66)
The detailed calculation of the leading order correction is carried out in Ref. [3]. Here
we remark that i) given the size of the correction, the asymptotic limit is representative
also of the regime where z is only moderately large. ii) the free energy for z large is
approximately given by
F'− z
2
+
q
∑
b=0
nb log(nb)−naha+ ze−z
(−nahaeha +∑
b6=a
nbhbehb
)
+o(e−z). (67)
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For this expression it is clear that the global minimum for large z is the solution with
the maximum naha. In the case in which two or more direction have the same value of
hini the solution with the bigger value of hi will prevail.
A.7 Tradeoff
Let us now discuss the generalization of the above results to cases where informed in-
dividuals might be less social then their co-specific uniformed fellows. Several works,
for example [4], have assumed that there is a trade-off between sociality and the ability
of individuals to store, gather or process information. There is no conclusive evidence
that such trade-offs exist, to the best of our knowledge. Evidences are mounting that
individual-level information and social processes can be both present in collective de-
cision processes in fish groups [5, 6]. However, since this aspect has been included as
an important ingredient in other models, it is important to explore its reelvance in the
present context.
Our theoretical framework can be extended to account for this aspect in two differ-
ent ways: either by making informed individuals promote the formation of links at a
lower rate or by generalizing the choice behavior to a stochastic probabilistic model.
Here we show that the qualitative results discussed in the main paper are kept signifi-
cantly unchanged in both cases.
A.7.1 Heterogeneous link formation rates
A natural way to introduce a tradeoff between sociality and information is to assume
that informed individuals shall promote link creation at a lower rate.
Under this assumption it is possible to calculate the exact invariant distribution and
to proceed with the same calculations of the simpler case discussed in the main article.
In particular the large z and small z solutions are the same. Here we report the main
results, without repeating lengthy derivations.
We assume that individuals that are informed about direction α shall promote link
creation with rate ηα whereas uninformed individuals shall promote link creation with
rate η0. While we keep the dependence on α in η , it is reasonable to assume that
ηα = η1 takes the same value, irrespective of the preferred direction α 6= 0, for all
informed individuals.
In particular we have that the link creation rate for the creation of a link between
nodes i and j is :
1. η
αi+ηα j
N−1 if a j = a j (here αi = 0 denotes uninformed individuals)
2. 0 otherwise
The invariant measure therefore reads
pi(ω) =
1
Z
e∑i hαiδaiαi∏
j<i
(δaia j(ηαi +ηα j)
λ (N−1)
)gi j
. (68)
In order to obtain the distribution in term of population we have to distinguish
between two different types of links. Let us define Mαβa denote the number of links
between individuals that are in state a but would prefer to be in state α and individuals
that are in state a but would prefer to be in state β .For simplicity we shall extend the
notation described above denoting with preference 0 the individuals with no preference.
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Let Nαa denote the number of individuals that are in state a but would prefer to be in
state α .
It is trivial to infer from eq. (68) that, in term of these quantities, the invariant
distribution reads
pi(N,M) =
1
Z
N!
∏a N0a !∏aα Nαa !
e∑a haN
a
a ∏
a∈S,α∈S∪{0}
(Nαa (Nαa −1)
2
Mααa
)(
2ηα
λ (N−1)
)Mααa
∏
β∈S∪{0},β 6=α
(
Nαa N
β
a
Mαβa
)(
ηα +ηβ
λ (N−1)
)Mma
.
(69)
Summing over M’s and taking the logarithm we get that
log(pi)=∑
aα
Nαa log(N
α
a )−∑
a
haNaa−
(
∑
aαβ
Nαa N
β
a
ηα +ηβ
λ (N−1)
)
−∑
aα
Nα
2ηα
λ (N−1) (70)
thus leading to a free energy in the thermodynamic limit:
F(n;zα ,hα) =∑
aα
nαa log(n
α
a )−∑
a
hαnaa−
1
2∑a
(
∑
α
zαnαa
)
na (71)
The saddle point equations can be derived in a straightforward manner, following the
steps outlined above for the homogeneous case.
The numerical solution of these equations can be studied as a function of the pa-
rameters. In particular, in the extreme case where ηα = 0 for all informed individuals
(α > 0) exhibits the same hysteric behavior of the homogeneous case discussed above.
The limit z0 = η0/λ  1 can also be studied in exactly the same way as above, with
the same conclusion, that corrections to the coordinated solutions n∗b = δab are expo-
nentially small in z0. From Eq. (71) it is clear that again the dominant solution for z0
large is the one with the largest product naha, exactly as in the homogeneous case. This
conclusion also extends to the case where zα = z1 > 0 for α 6= 0.
A.7.2 Generalized internal update rule
A different way to introduce a tradeoff between sociality and preferences is to modify
the update rule (13), by assuming that individuals weight their preferred choice and the
choice taken by neighbors when updating their choices. One way to do this is to assume
that individual i, when an internal state update event occurs, will pick up randomly an
internal state with a probability proportional to:
Pi(a) ∝ e
hαiδaαi+βi∑ j gi jδaa j . (72)
The parameterβi measures to what extent individual i takes into account the choices
of the social group in making his decision. The effect of this choice is mostly evident
by discussing the limiting cases:
1. if βi → 0, individual i will make its choices selfishly, without considering the
choices of its neighbouring individuals;
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Figure 5: Plot of the average degree obtained in numerical simulations of the model
with stochastic choice update. These are based on 100 runs, with N = 5000 nodes and
parameter n0 = 0.99, n1 = 0.01 and h1 = 0.05 for different values of β (the value is
written in the legend) for the informed individuals (the uninformed ones have βi = ∞).
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2. if βi→∞, individual i will make its choices always conforming to its neighbour-
hood, if ths is not empty. Only when his neighborhood is empty, his choice will
reflect the pieces of information it possesses: this is exactly the case discussed
in the main paper.
As one can see, βi interpolates between a fully pro-social behaviour and a com-
pletely individualistic one; the tradeoff may be simply introduced assuming that uni-
formed individuals have βi = ∞ whereas informed individuals have lower βi.
The drawback of this extension of the model is that, as soon as βi < ∞, the system
is not analytically solvable and can only be investigated by numerical stochastic sim-
ulations. Fig. A.7.2 reports a series of numerical simulations of this extended model.
This shows that introducing a trade-off between sociality and preference does not qual-
itatively change the behaviour of the system; the only appreciable difference being the
fact that the symmetric solution becomes unstable at lower values of z. Therefore, even
though quantitative results differ, the qualitative picture described in the article holds
true also in this more general model.
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